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Abstract 
Purpose – This study investigates which dimensions of the management control system (MCS) increase the 
perception of organizational justice and reduce unethical behavior in the perception of managers. The purpose 
of this paper is to validate the theoretical model of the study of Langevin and Mendoza (2012), testing the 
theoretical hypotheses formulated by the authors.  
Design/methodology/approach – A survey was performed in companies listed among the Best and Largest 
of Exame Magazine, and the sample is composed of 102 respondents of the research, which consists of 41 assertions.  
Findings – The results of the structural equation modeling show that the definition of objectives increases 
the perception of procedural justice, but the same was not observed regarding the remuneration of the 
managers. Likewise, disregarding aspects that are uncontrollable by managers in performance evaluation 
does not lead to the perception of procedural and distributive justice. However, feedback quality leads to the 
understanding that the MCS is fair. Perception of procedural and distributive justice was also observed in the 
use of multiple measures of performance by the company.  
Research limitations/implications – Other factors that have not been investigated may interfere with 
and contribute to the reduction of unethical behavior (budget slack and data manipulation).  
Originality/value – The only variable that interferes in the reduction of unethical behavior is feedback 
quality. The non-confirmation of all the hypotheses instigates the replication of the research in other contexts 
for empirical validation of the theoretical model of Langevin and Mendoza (2012). 
Keywords Organizational justice, Budgetary slack, Data manipulation,  
Management control system, Unethical behaviors 
Paper type Research paper 
1. Introduction 
Organizational justice is socially constructed and influences people’s attitudes and 
behaviors in the workplace (Folger and Konovsky, 1989). Omar (2006) mentions that 
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organizational justice refers to employees’ perceptions of what they consider fair or unfair in 
their work environment. Therefore, organizational justice, also referred to as organizational 
fairness, is understood as the fairness perceived by the employees regarding the work 
relations within the organization. 
Research studies have been conducted to identify how it happens, which elements 
promote feelings of injustice, and what the main reactions of individuals are. Langevin and 
Mendoza (2012) emphasize that, if the management control system (MCS) is considered 
unfair, it can lead managers to behave in a way that is harmful to the organization. For 
example, it may lead managers to have unethical behaviors (Langevin and Mendoza, 2012), 
such as propensity to create budgetary slack (Onsi, 1973; Merchant, 1985; Dunk, 1993) and 
manipulate data (Merchant and Rockness, 1994). 
The first unethical behavior, creation of budgetary slack, is considered by Merchant 
(1985) as the difference between the amount budgeted and the amount really necessary to 
meet the forecasted needs, i.e. it represents the slack as the excess resources requested to 
execute a task. In this way, budgetary slack can be understood as intentional 
underestimation of productive capacities and overestimation of spending in a budget (Libby, 
2003; Anthony and Govindarajan, 2006). 
The second unethical behavior, data manipulation, is associated to the assessment of the 
managers’ performance. MCSs include performance measurement mechanisms that 
organizations use to verify whether the results are aligned with the objectives and to assess 
managers’ performance. In this process, managers can try to build a favorable self-image, 
different from the real one, with a tendency to manipulate the performance indicators 
(Merchant and Van Der Stede, 2007). Data manipulation can occur through falsification, 
which involves providing erroneous data or managing the results, which is any action of 
managers that affects the result and does not represent the economic situation of the 
organization (Merchant and Rockness, 1994). 
For Ackroyd and Thompson (1999), unethical behavior cannot be tackled, at least not 
with the traditional means of coercion and forced incentives. However, over the past decade, 
some MCS researchers have begun to use the knowledge provided by research studies on 
organizational justice (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001) and identified 
that these unethical behaviors can be reduced when MCSs are perceived to be fair (Little 
et al., 2002; Wentzel, 2004; Staley and Magner, 2007). 
Langevin and Mendoza (2012) identified four critical characteristics that need to be 
observed in relation to MCS: 
(1) the opportunity given to managers to participate in setting objectives; 
(2) application of the controllability principle in setting objectives or in the 
performance assessment; 
(3) quality of feedback; and 
(4) use of multiple measures of performance. 
They all represent key dimensions of MCS, i.e. they characterize how the objectives are 
defined, the results are measured and performance is assessed. These characteristics can be 
reflected in the perception of organizational justice and in the individuals’ attitudes and 
behaviors. 
In this perspective, Langevin and Mendoza (2012) constructed a theoretical 
framework regarding the effects of MCS on unethical behaviors through perceived 
organizational justice, organizational commitment and trust in the supervisor to 
identify: 
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� what characteristics of MCS increase perceived impartiality; and  
� how the perception of MCS’s justice reduces managers’ propensity to create 
budgetary slack and manipulate data. 
In the theoretical model, they propose, initially, to test the association of the mentioned 
characteristics of MCS with organizational justice (distributive, procedural and interactional). 
Then, to test the association of perception of organizational justice with unethical behaviors, in 
this case, the creation of budgetary slack with the increase of organizational commitment, and 
data manipulation with the increase of trust in the supervisor. 
However, Langevin and Mendoza (2012) warn that this theoretical model still needs to be 
empirically tested, which reveals a research gap. The present study seeks to validate the 
theoretical model of Langevin and Mendoza’s (2012) study, testing the theoretical 
hypotheses formulated by the authors, which they didn’t test empirically. Thus, the question 
that guides this study is: Which MCS dimensions indicated by Langevin and Mendoza 
(2012) raise the perception of organizational justice and reduce managers’ unethical behavior 
(creation of budgetary slack and data manipulation)? 
In the past two decades, there has been a large number of scandals in the business world, 
many of them in different ways related to accounting and management control (Cuguer�o- 
Escofet and Rosanas, 2017). These authors warn that it is relevant to understand the 
dysfunctional effects of measurement systems and incentives, and the possible ways to 
overcome such dysfunctional effects. Thus, searching for explanations for possible unethical 
behaviors in relation to MCS components in large Brazilian companies is interesting, since 
this may be one of the origins of many of the scandals. 
In this sense, the objective is to contribute to the development of this field of research 
from the perspective of the managerial accounting, by addressing aspects of MCS associated 
with perception of organizational justice, organizational commitment and trust in the 
supervisor and the reflexes in the creation of budgetary slack and data manipulation. These 
aspects are important because these behaviors distort the processes of planning and 
performance measurement and may lead managers to make decisions that are contrary to 
the interests of the organization, as well as generating unnecessary costs and rewards that 
are detrimental to the organization (Langevin and Mendoza, 2012). 
2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Perception of organizational justice in the management control system 
An act is only fair because someone perceives it to be so (Fortin, 2008). In a research on 
justice conducted by Mikula (1980), the work environment was one of the places of social 
coexistence that presented the largest number of events considered unfair. Colquitt (2001) 
warns that injustices in the workplace can trigger stress, burnout, loss of commitment, 
absenteeism and other individual and organizational problems. For Cohen-Charash and 
Spector (2001), injustices in the workplace affect employees’ behavior because, in addition to 
reducing their satisfaction and performance, they worsen feelings about the company, can 
harm the health of the individual and compromise the results of the organization. 
Organizational justice is usually approached in the literature in three dimensions: 
distributive, procedural and interactional (Sotomayor, 2007; Beuren et al., 2016a, 2016b, 
2016c). The latter is divided by some authors into informational and interpersonal 
(Greenberg, 1993). Distributive justice refers to the perceptions of employees’ justice in what 
they receive from the organization, having as a parameter the equity between individuals 
(Folger and Cropanzano, 1998). Procedural justice refers to the employees’ perceptions of 
justice in the procedures adopted in the organizational processes (Leventhal, 1980). 
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Interaction justice refers to the employees’ perceptions of justice in the interpersonal, 
procedural or procedural aspects and is divided in informational and interpersonal. 
Informational refers to the explanations provided to the employees (Colquitt et al., 2001). 
Interpersonal refers to the degree of courtesy, dignity and respect with which they are 
treated by superiors (Colquitt et al., 2001). 
Chenhall (2003) argues that it seems likely that issues associated to organizational 
justice, commitment and trust can help explain how individuals react to information. In 
general, the results of the research studies indicate that the perceptions of organizational 
justice affect a wide range of organizational attitudes and behaviors and can interact with 
each other in explaining these same attitudes and behaviors (Colquitt, 2001; Rego and Souto, 
2004; Sotomayor, 2007; Maia, 2013; Beuren et al., 2016a). Among them, the creation of 
budgetary slack and data manipulation, unethical behaviors highlighted by Langevin and 
Mendoza (2012), are important in this study. 
Research studies on the relationship between unethical behavior and organizational 
justice indicate that the propensity to create budgetary slack is reduced when the procedures 
and the enactment of decisions are considered fair (Little et al., 2002; Wentzel, 2004). Staley 
and Magner (2007) demonstrated how procedural and interactional justice reduces 
managers’ propensity to create budgetary slack, enhancing trust in the supervisor. However, 
no research has been found that seeks to identify the relationship between organizational 
justice and data manipulation and not even whether MCS reduces unethical behavior when 
there is a greater perception of organizational justice. 
MCS can be a facilitating mechanism for the adoption of business strategies and one of 
the main artifacts of the management process. Anthony (1965) understands managerial 
control as an explicit and formalized mechanism that contributes to the company achieving 
maximum efficiency and effectiveness, given that the purpose of the system is to promote 
the alignment between the objectives, so that personal purposes coincide with business’ 
purposes. They include all the mechanisms that managers use to ensure that their 
subordinates present behaviors and make decisions that are consistent with the 
organization’s objectives and strategies (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2006; Merchant and 
Van Der Stede, 2007). 
The focus of Anthony’s (1965) conceptualization of managerial control is to stimulate 
individual performance through financial rewards without considering the values and ideas 
of people in the design of MCS. On the other hand, Flamholtz (1979) understands managerial 
control as the process of influencing the behavior of the members of the organization, in 
order for people to behave in a way that favors the achievement of the organizational 
objectives. It is not about controlling people’s behavior, but influencing them to act in line 
with the organization’s predetermined goals. 
Simons (1995) proposed a theoretical model of MCS with four levers: belief systems, 
boundary systems, diagnostic control systems and interactive control systems. According to 
Henri (2006), the construction of these four levers is because of the fact that MCS generates 
dynamic tensions, since managers need to achieve organizational objectives that may be 
conflicting, and the idea is that the four levers help in balancing these tensions, producing 
adequate balance. 
Therefore, managers are affected by the design and use of MCSs and this is reflected in 
the managers’ perception of justice (Langevin and Mendoza, 2012). For these authors, MCS 
is linked to issues of distributive justice, because the underlying financial results, whether in 
determining objectives or allocating resources, affect managers’ rewards. It is also related to 
aspects of procedural justice, because setting objectives, performance assessment and 
establishing rewards depend on procedures (Beuren et al., 2016c). MCS can also affect 
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interactional justice, particularly in the interaction of subordinates with their superiors, in 
negotiating budgetary goals, in evaluating performance, and in establishing rewards 
(Langevin and Mendoza, 2012). 
2.2 Unethical behavior: creation of budgetary slack and data manipulation 
Ethical behaviors can be defined as those that, at the same time, are legal and acceptable to 
organizations (Jones, 1991). This study focuses on two behaviors that may be considered 
unethical: creation of budgetary slack and data manipulation. According to Langevin and 
Mendoza (2012), these two types of unethical behaviors are widely observed in 
organizations. 
Budgetary slack occurs when the manager, without the consent of his superiors, 
overestimates the expenses, underestimates the revenues and overestimates the demand for 
resources under his responsibility (Davis et al., 2006), aiming at self-satisfaction in the 
remuneration process for results related to the budget (Onsi, 1973; Libby, 2003; Beuren et al., 
2015b). According to Cyert and March (1963), this is a manager’s dysfunctional behavior in 
the budgetary process. 
Hopwood (1972) found in his research that managers assessed only based on the budget 
are more likely to create budgetary slack, than when using multiple assessment systems. 
For the author, the creation of slack occurs basically to fulfill the forecasted budget. In this 
sense, Dunk (1993) and Lavarda and Fank (2014) warn that the main argument for 
managers to create slack in their budgets is to improve the prospects of their performance- 
based remuneration. 
Data manipulation, in turn, is seen as unethical behavior when aiming at personal 
advantages (Merchant and Van Der Stede, 2007). Condé (2013) points out that to reduce the 
failures of internal control that trigger data manipulation, some issues require attention, 
such as verifying why a person practices a specific action to distort the company’s results, 
while another, in a similar situation, does not practice such action or practices different 
action, with the same purpose. 
According to Merchant (1985), employees of companies, regardless of their position, are 
prone to make decisions that serve their own interests, to the detriment of the organization, 
in accordance with the conflict of interests between principal and agent, as advocated in 
agency theory. The author explains that managers, for example, can manipulate the 
performance reports of their department to present better results, even knowing that the 
information reported is untrue and, in many cases, may even harm the organization. 
Langevin and Mendoza (2012) argue that the perceived justice in the company’s MCS can 
be a mechanism to reduce the creation of these unethical behaviors. Cuguer�o-Escofet and 
Rosanas (2017) argue that the perceived justice in the design and use of MCS may be formal 
and/or informal and investigated the prominence of both through case studies. They 
concluded that, in any case, it is a necessary condition for the congruence of the objectives of 
the individuals and the organization, their stability over time, besides the ethical behavior 
that the system with these characteristics can generate in the organization. 
Whether the perceived justice is formal or informal, the distributive, procedural and 
interactional justices interact to form a global judgment of the process and, from this, 
managers can perceive it as globally fair and, thus, less likely to create budgetary slack and 
manipulate data. Therefore, it is important to verify empirically if the perception of 
organizational justice in MCS reduces unethical behavior, in the view of the company’s 
managers. In this perspective, the objective is to test empirically the theoretical hypotheses 
proposed in the study by Langevin and Mendoza (2012). Thus, a synthesis of the study of 
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these authors, with a view to contextualize the formulation of theoretical hypotheses, is 
presented below. 
2.3 Study of Langevin and Mendoza (2012) 
Langevin and Mendoza (2012) constructed a general framework based on the theoretical 
results of their research to identify the dimensions of MCS that increase perceived 
impartiality and how the perception of justice of MCS reduces the propensity of managers to 
create budgetary slack and manipulate data. The authors identified four critical 
characteristics or key dimensions of MCS: managers’ participation in setting goals, 
controllability principle, quality feedback and multiple measures of performance. 
The first key dimension of MCS increases the perception of procedural justice in function 
of the alignment with the procedural rules proposed by Leventhal et al. (1980), as the 
participation:  
� serves as a means of communication between subordinates and superiors, allowing 
subordinates to exchange and seek information with their superiors, which tends to 
improve the accuracy of the data used in the decision-making process;  
� allows subordinates to voice their complaints and correct any prior inadequate 
beliefs of their superiors;  
� allows subordinates to expose their concerns and values, which favors 
representativeness; and  
� satisfies the criterion of ethics, since it is consistent with the moral value that people 
have the opportunity to be involved in setting goals. 
According to Langevin and Mendoza (2012), the perception of distributive justice also 
increases when managers are heard, because participation gives managers the opportunity 
to influence their objectives, as well as the amount of resources that will be allocated to them. 
In addition, participation gives them the opportunity to influence the objectives, which will 
then be used as a reference for their assessment. Thus, participation can increase the 
chances that managers will receive fair rewards, as they will depend on the targets they 
helped to set. 
The second key dimension of MCS predicts that managers should be assessed only based 
on what they can control. Langevin and Mendoza (2012) argue that the controllability 
principle meets most of the procedural rules set forth by Leventhal et al. (1980). First, the 
removal of uncontrollable factors from targets and assessments indicates that the 
performance measurement will be tied to the managers’ efforts rather than to events beyond 
their control. Second, the controllability principle allows greater consistency in procedures 
of performance assessment. Third, the implementation of the controllability principle 
implies neutralization of uncontrollable factors that could affect the results of the assessed 
ones. Fourth, the controllability principle is in line with the ethical criteria, under the 
argument of Merchant and Van Der Stede (2000), of being more ethical not to penalize 
managers for results adversely affected by uncontrollable events. 
The third key dimension of the MCS regards to the perception of procedural justice is the 
quality of feedback (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). Consistency and precision, two rules 
of Leventhal et al. (1980), are the main features of the quality of the performance feedback 
(Hartmann and Slapnicar, 2009). Quality feedback also affects interactional justice. 
According to Colquitt and Jackson (2006), providing quality feedback favors 
approachability and encourages communication between managers and their superiors. 
Therefore, it contributes to promote informational justice, which is one of the two 
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components of interpersonal justice. In addition, superiors who discuss the results with their 
subordinates are considered as being more respectful. Quality feedback may indicate that 
subordinates are valued as members of the group. 
The fourth key dimension pointed out by Langevin and Mendoza (2012) is the adoption 
of multiple measures of performance, which affect more the distributive justice by 
measuring more accurately the actual performance. The use of multiple performance 
indicators provides greater accuracy in comparing performance indicators with 
organizational results, and this is reflected in the employees’ greater perceptions of 
distributive justice (Burke et al., 2009). The use of multiple non-financial measures can also 
contribute to increase the perception of procedural justice of MCS, as the accuracy of the 
information is a relevant criterion of procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980). 
Research studies (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Jesus and Rowe, 
2015; Dal Vesco et al., 2016) show that greater perception of justice has positive impact on 
the behavior of employees in relation to the organization, because it results in greater 
satisfaction at work, trust in the supervisor, commitment and organizational citizenship 
behavior, besides reducing stress. Among the positive effects of perceived justice, 
organizational commitment and trust in the supervisor, according to Langevin and Mendoza 
(2012), are useful in explaining the relationship between MCS perceived as fair and the 
reduction of unethical behaviors. 
According to Mowday et al. (1979), when managers are committed to the organization for 
which they work, they will tend less to make decisions that could harm it. Nouri and Parker 
(1996) found that high level of commitment is associated with decrease in the level of 
budgetary slack. Therefore, the perceived justice of MCS is reflected in greater 
organizational commitment, thus reducing the propensity of managers to create budgetary 
slack and manipulate data. 
Trust in the superior conveys greater meaning to the managers’ perception of control 
over results. This perception of control is an essential component of organizational justice 
(Folger and Greenberg, 1985). If subordinates trust their superiors, they will be less likely to 
develop unethical behaviors, as it is argued that trust implies in the expectation that the 
other party will act kindly (Whitener et al., 1998). 
Based on the above, Langevin and Mendoza (2012) elaborated the theoretical hypotheses 
presented in Table I. In the first six hypotheses, the intention was to verify which 
characteristics of MCS increase the managers’ perception to consider it fair. In the following 
five hypotheses, they sought to verify the reasons why MCS is understood as fair, 
contributing to the reduction of managers’ propensity to create budgetary slack or 
manipulate the data. 
According to Table I, Langevin and Mendoza (2012) suggest that the two attitudinal 
outcomes (organizational commitment and trust in the superior) help explain why 
perceptions of justice in MCS reduce unethical behavior. The assumption is that the 
perception of organizational justice in the MCS operates on two levels; it: 
(1) affects the relationship between the employee and the organization as a whole 
(organizational commitment); and 
(2) influences the relationship with the superior (trust in the superior). 
And the two attitudinal variables, in turn, reduce the propensity of employees to adopt 
unethical behavior. Figure 1 illustrates these relationships proposed by the authors. 
Because of the limitations of the study, Langevin and Mendoza (2012) emphasized that 
the first step necessary is the test of the theoretical hypotheses proposed. Thus, the purpose 
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of this research is to test them empirically to verify whether the perception of organizational 
justice in MCS reduces unethical behavior in large Brazilian companies. 
3. Research methodology 
This descriptive research was carried out based on a survey that had as population the 500 
companies listed among the Best and Largest of Exame Magazine, edition of 2014. The 
Figure 1. 
Effects of MCS on 
unethical behavior 
through perceived 
organizational justice, 
organizational 
commitment, and 
trust in the superior 
Table I.  
Theoretical 
hypotheses proposed 
by Langevin and 
Mendoza (2012)  
Hypotheses Description  
H1a Participation in setting objectives increases the procedural justice perceived in MCS 
H1b Participation in setting objectives increases the perceived distributive justice in MCS 
H2a Application of the controllability principle increases the perceived distributive justice in 
MCS 
H2b Application of the controllability principle increases the procedural justice perceived in MCS 
H3a Quality of feedback increases the procedural justice perceived in MCS 
H3b Quality of feedback enhances perceived interactional justice in MCS 
H4a Use of multiple non-financial performance indicators increases the perceived distributive 
justice in MCS 
H4b Use of multiple non-financial performance indicators increases the procedural justice 
perceived in MCS 
H5a Organizational justice perceived in MCS reduces the propensity to create budgetary slack 
with increased organizational commitment 
H5b Organizational justice perceived in MCS reduces the propensity to manipulate data with 
increased organizational commitment 
H6a Organizational justice perceived in MCS reduces the propensity to create budgetary slack 
with increasing trust in the superior 
H6b Perceived organizational justice in MCS reduces the propensity to manipulate data with 
increased trust in the superior  
Source: Prepared based on Langevin and Mendoza (2012)   
Management 
control system  
61  
option for this population stems from the fact that large companies tend to have a 
consolidated MCS and division by areas of responsibility, which is essential to 
operationalize the purpose of this study. The research subjects are composed of the 
managers of these companies. 
To estimate the minimum sample size, G*Power 3.1.9 software was used (Faul et al., 
2009). As recommended by Cohen (1988), the power of the test was used at 0.80 and the 
median f2 was 0.15. Considering the number of four predictors (Figure 1) and that, for PLS, it 
is the one that defines the minimum sample size, the result of the software pointed out that 
the minimum number is 85 cases. The nonrandom sample consisted of the 102 managers 
who responded the research instrument; thus, it is adequate to estimate the hypothesis of the 
research. 
The research instrument comprised 41 assertions, based on studies developed by Dunk 
(1993), Rego (2002), Widener (2006), L�opez et al. (2007), Hartmann and Slapnicar (2009), 
Burkert et al. (2011) and Langevin and Mendoza (2012), as shown in Table II. 
In the research instrument, assertions were presented for each hypothesis, and managers 
were asked to indicate, in a seven-point scale, their degree of agreement (1 = totally disagree 
and 7 = totally agree). The equality of points in the scale had the purpose of minimizing the 
problems of arbitrary weighting the categories of qualitative variables, as, according to 
Fávero et al. (2009), there is no logic that justifies the adoption of certain weights to the 
detriment of others. However, it is worth remembering that the scales and instruments used 
were consolidated by theory and applied/validated in previous studies. It is also important 
to highlight that the scores of the confirmatory factorial analysis were used, allowing to 
extract a new aggregate measure of the variables by weighing the scores of the respondents 
of each item by the factorial score of the variable, in each unit of the sample (Silva and Costa, 
2014). 
Google Docs was used for the preparation and sending of the research instrument. Before 
the application of the questionnaire, a pretest was carried out with three doctoral students, 
and some writing adjustments were made based on the suggestions presented and 
afterwards it was sent to the research subjects. The questionnaire was sent several times in 
the period from August to December, 2014. 
The data were initially paired in the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) program, 
Windows 19. Structural equations modeling (SEM) was used to test the hypothesis. Partial 
least squares (PLS-PM) method was applied for the estimation of the structural equations 
model. The use of this method is justified by the fact that the PLS-PM meets the prediction 
objectives and also constructs theoretical models in a more exploratory than confirmatory 
sense, as there are no indicators of adjustment of the adequacy of the model as a whole (Bido 
et al., 2010). 
The SEM-PLS model was analyzed in two sequential steps, the measurement model and 
the structural model (Hair et al., 2005). To apply structural equations it is assumed the use of 
continuous variables, but the use of categorical variables, including the Likert-type scale, is 
common. Ordinal scales violate some assumptions of SEM, such as continuity and 
normality. However, the simulations indicate that the results are reliable provided that at 
least five classes are used and that the distribution approaches normality (Bollen and Long, 
1992). 
Klem (2006) explains that the PLS technique allows testing a set of variables to 
investigate the level of explanation of the predictor variables to the dependent variables 
(multiple regression aspects) and indicates the most important predictor variable (factor 
analysis). It also allows to verify whether the theoretical model is valid, based on the real 
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data observed (Hox and Bechger, 1998), and to simultaneously evaluate relationships among 
multiple constructs (Campana et al., 2009). 
The use of PLS model is because of the fact that it allows the use of latent variables with 
formative indicators instead of reflective indicators (Hair et al., 2011). Formative indicators 
are those variables that form the construct and do not have correlation with each other, 
Table II.  
Composition of the 
research instrument  
Variables Questions used from previous studies Original scale*  
Organizational justice From Rego’s (2002) questionnaire, for 
organizational justice, only three of the 17 
assertions regarding the distributive 
justice of tasks were used (15 to 17) 
Likert of 6 points (1 = strongly 
disagree and 6 = strongly agree) 
Organizational 
Commitment 
From Rego’s (2002) questionnaire, for 
organizational commitment, all (three) 
assertions were used 
Likert of 6 points (1 = strongly 
disagree and 6 = strongly agree) 
Trust in the superior From Hartmann and Slapnicar’s (2009 
questionnaire), for trust in the superior, all 
(three) the assertions of question 7 were 
used 
Likert 5 points (1 = totally disagree 
and 5 = totally agree) 
Budgetary slack From Dunk’s (1993) questionnaire, from 
the set of six assertions related to 
budgetary slack, the three that were not 
reverse-scaled were used 
Likert 7 points (1 = totally disagree 
and 7 = totally agree) 
Data manipulation From Dunk’s (1993) questionnaire, from 
the set of six assertions related to 
information asymmetry, the three most 
pertinent to the possible manipulations of 
the data were used 
Likert of 7 points (1 = My superior . . .
much better . . . and 7 = Me . . . much 
better . . .) 
Setting objectives From L�opez, Stammerjohan, and McNair’s 
(2007) questionnaire, four of the six 
assertions of the question about 
budgetary participation were used, 
replacing the term budget with goals and 
objectives 
Likert 7 points (1 = totally disagree 
and 7 = totally agree) 
Controllability 
principle 
From Burkert, Fischer and Schäffer’s 
(2011) questionnaire, the first three 
assertions concerning the Controllability 
Principle were used 
Likert of 7 points (1 = a little and 7 = 
totally) 
Multiple measures of 
performance 
The first assertion about multiple 
performance measures was based on 
Widener’s (2006) study. One assertion 
from Hartmann and Slapnicar’s (2009) 
questionnaire was used. The other two 
assertions were based on Langevin and 
Mendoza’s (2012) study 
Likert 7 points (1 = totally disagree 
and 7 = totally agree) 
Quality of feedback The four assertions of question 5 from 
Hartmann and Slapnicar’s (2009) 
questionnaire were used for the quality of 
feedback 
Likert 5 points (1 = totally disagree 
and 5 = totally agree)  
Note: *To avoid differences in weights in the varied Likert scale in each variable, all scales were considered 
as seven points, thus unifying the categories of the qualitative variables 
Source: Own elaboration   
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while the reflective ones are formed by the construct and measured by scales (Hair et al., 
2011). The software SmartPLS version 2.00 was used. 
4. Description and analysis of results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table III shows the descriptive analysis of the measures of minimum, maximum, median, 
mode, mean and standard deviation for the answers to the questions of the questionnaire. 
It can be observed in Table III that the answers have certain linearity, with median 
varying between 3 and 6, in the Likert scale of seven points, and mode between 4 and 7. The 
mode result (5) for the assertive in reversal scale for Controllability Principle is surprising, as 
most respondents point out that their performance assessment includes aspects they cannot 
control. For Giraud et al. (2008), this principle is a prerequisite for establishing a sense of 
justice in relation to the performance assessment system. Therefore, managers may feel 
wronged in their performance assessment if there are no procedures to mitigate 
uncontrollable aspects, as observed in the mode (4) of the dimension of procedural justice. 
On the other hand, results for median (5) and mode (7) of the multiple measures of 
performance construct show that the performance assessments of respondents are anchored 
in objective information derived from MCS and subjective information is always 
substantiated. This is reflected in the perception of justice and in the managers’ 
organizational commitment. 
4.2 Measurement model 
It is important to mention that the data of this research were collected through self-answered 
questionnaires. Podsakoff et al. (2003) warn that this method may lead to common method 
bias (CMB). Following the guidance of these authors, in relation to procedural techniques, 
the respondents were assured the anonymity of the participants and that the answers would 
be treated in an aggregate manner. Regarding the statistical technique, Harmans’ single- 
factor test was used, which, according to Podsakoff and Organ (1986), is the most commonly 
used method in the literature in general. If in the analysis a single factor or a general factor 
explains more than 50 per cent of variance of the variables, the CMB will be present, which 
did not occur in this study. 
Table III.  
Descriptive analysis  
Variables Minimum Maximum Median Mode Mean SD  
Distributive justice 1 7 5 5 4.58 1.57 
Procedural justice 1 7 4 4 4.12 1.79 
Interactional justice 1 7 5 6 4.84 1.68 
Organizational commitment 1 7 6 7 5.39 1.66 
Trust in the superior 1 7 4 4 4.36 1.64 
Budgetary slack 1 7 5 4 4.37 1.75 
Data Manipulation 1 7 5 6 5.03 1.48 
Setting objectives 1 7 5 6 4.91 1.59 
Controllability principle 1 7 3 5 3.48 1,64 
Quality of Feedback 1 7 4 5 4.53 2.02 
Multiple measures of performance 1 7 5 7 3.89 1.86  
Source: Research data   
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After the control of the bias, the quality of the model was evaluated through composite 
reliability, Cronbach’s alpha, convergent validity and discriminant validity. Table IV 
presents the adequacy indexes of the SEM-PLS model. 
The composite reliability analysis of each construct has the function of evaluating 
whether the index adequately measured the constructs. Thus, the index should be greater 
than or equal to 0.70 (Hair et al., 2005). By the analysis of Table IV, the constructs budgetary 
slack and controllability principle presented lower indexes of 0.673 and 0.485, respectively. 
Because of their importance for the structural model, it was decided to keep them in the 
research because the analysis was carried out considering the previous research studies and 
the original theoretical model. 
This aspect can be justified by the fact that the theoretical model of Langevin and 
Mendoza (2012) has not been tested empirically yet, which in this case can contribute to the 
improvement of the research related to MCS, organizational justice and budgetary slack, as 
well as to the manipulation of data. Regarding the controllability principle, the construct 
was measured based on Burkert et al.’s (2011) model, already tested in 2011, but in another 
country (Germany) and with other theoretical dimensions. 
For the internal consistency analysis (Cronbach’s alpha), values from 0.60 were 
considered appropriate (Hair et al., 2005). Pasquali (2003) points out that when the number of 
items is small, this data should be relativized, since in this case the item under analysis 
substantially affects the total score, which may have occurred in the constructs budgetary 
slack and multiple measures of Performance, with, respectively, 0.576 and 0.560, close to 
0.60. Thus, the indicators are considered to have adequately measured the constructs. 
The convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs is evaluated by the average 
variance extracted, which should be higher than 0.50 (Hair et al., 2005). To perform the 
discriminant validity analysis, the criterion of Gaski and Nevin’s (1985) study was used, 
which recommend that the comparisons of the composite reliability of each construct with 
correlations between the constructs should be smaller than their reliability. For the 
constructs studied, the discriminant validity between all dimensions was verified, as can be 
observed in Table V, where the composite reliability (diagonal, in bold) is perceived as 
greater than the correlation between the constructs. 
Table IV.  
Adequacy indexes of 
the SEM-PLS model  
Constructs AVE 
Composed 
Reliability R2 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha Communality Redundancy  
Commitment   0.885   0.958   0.466   0.935   0.885   0.188 
Trust   0.851   0.945   0.661   0.912   0.851   0.198 
Setting objectives   0.610   0.860   0.000   0.798   0.610   0.000 
Budgetary slack   0.432   0.673   0.316   0.560   0.432   0.043 
Distributive justice   0.849   0.965   0.299   0.955   0.849   0.094 
Interactional justice   0.800   0.960   0.437   0.950   0.800   0.349 
Procedural justice   0.789   0.918   0.541   0.867   0.789   0.236 
Data manipulation   0.900   0.964   0.162   0.944   0.900     0.082 
Multiple measures of 
performance   0.534   0.772   0.000   0.576   0.534   0.000 
Controllability 
principle   0.361   0.485   0.000   0.682   0.361   0.000 
Quality of feedback   0.824   0.933   0.000   0.894   0.824   0.000  
Source: Research data   
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Discriminant validity 
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The next step, according to Hair et al. (2005), is to validate the structural model, which 
implies verifying R2 values, i.e. the percentage of variance of a latent variable that is 
explained by other latent variables. R2 values provide an adjustment measure for each 
structural equation, only for endogenous latent variables, being recommended values close 
to 1. It can be seen in Table IV that the lowest R2 among the constructs was 0.162 for the 
latent variable data manipulation. This result can be considered weak, but considering that 
the structural model is a theoretical model, not empirically investigated yet, the results can 
be admitted. 
In summary, only the constructs budgetary slack, controllability principle and data 
manipulation were partially validated. On the other hand, only one of the constructs (data 
manipulation) did not meet the validation criterion of the structural model. In spite of that, 
this construct was maintained in the analysis, considering that it is a theoretical dimension 
of the structural model of Langevin and Mendoza (2012). However, more research is 
recommended given the constitutive and operational setting of this construct, which deals 
with data manipulation associated with ethical and moral factors. 
4.3 Structural model and hypothesis test 
After that, the hypothesis were tested for each path diagram of the structural model to 
identify whether the t-values were greater than 1.96 for p < 0.05, as recommended by Hair 
et al. (2005). Table VI shows the direct effects, with the purpose of testing the hypotheses 
H1, H2, H3 and H4. The results show that the relationship between setting objective and 
distributive justice, as well as controllability principle and distributive justice and 
controllability principle and procedural justice, did not present statistical significance. 
The first hypothesis (H1a) sought to verify whether participation in setting objectives is 
significantly related to procedural justice. The results were significant at p < 0.01, i.e. when 
managers participate in setting objectives, business processes are considered fair. 
According to Langevin and Mendoza (2012), participation in setting objectives serves as a 
means of communication between subordinates and their superiors and allows subordinates 
to exchange and seek information with their superiors, which can improve the accuracy of 
the data used in the decision-making process. Participating in setting goals and objectives 
allows subordinates to express their opinions, participate proactively in the pursuit of 
continuous improvement and correct any superiors’ inadequate previous beliefs, as well as 
satisfying the criterion of ethics, as it is consistent with the moral value that people should 
have the opportunity to get involved in setting goals. 
Table VI.  
PLS Results – path 
coefficients – direct 
effect  
Structural relationship Beta direct effect t-Test Hypothesis p-value  
S. Obj.! Proc. Just.   0.334   3.407   H1a   0.000** 
S. Obj.! Dist. Just.   0.163   1.483   H1b   0.138 
Contr. Prin.! Dist. Just.     0.120   0.886   H2a   0.376 
Contr. Prin.! Proc. Just.   0.045   0.566   H2b   0.571 
Feedback ! Proc. Just.   0.306   3.210   H3a   0.001** 
Feedback ! Inter. Just.   0.661   10.290   H3b   0.000** 
M.M. Perf.! Dist. Just.   0.380   3.814   H4a   0.000** 
M.M. Perf .! Proc. Just.   0.261   2.902   H4b   0.003**  
Notes: P.S.: *Significance p < 0,05; **significance p < 0,01 
Source: Research data   
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The hypothesis H1b sought to verify whether the participation in setting objectives 
increases the distributive justice perceived in MCS. The results do not support this assertion, 
i.e. the participation of the managers in setting objectives does not increase the distributive 
justice. Therefore, the empirical results do not confirm the theoretical premises, that 
participation can increase the chances of managers to receive fair rewards, as these will 
depend on the targets they have helped to define. Thus, participating in setting objectives is 
not directly linked to the remuneration received. This may indicate that companies do not 
necessarily reward managers fairly because they participate in setting goals and objectives. 
In this case, their remuneration would be more related to the improvement of economic– 
financial performance than to participatory leadership. Possibly, participatory leadership 
would be more associated with personal satisfaction and work environment than with 
income distribution. 
The second hypothesis (H2a and H2b) sought to verify whether the application of the 
controllability principle is significantly related to distributive justice and procedural justice. 
The results were not significant, i.e. when the company applies the controllability principle, 
its managers did not consider MCS to be fairer. This result is consistent with that of Beuren 
et al.’s (2015a), who, in replicating the research by Giraud et al. (2008) in the Brazilian 
environment, found out that managers are not concerned with the neutralization of 
uncontrollable factors. However, it contradicts the findings of Giraud et al. (2008) with 
French managers, which indicated that they wish to have internal factors controlled because 
of the perception of justice in this action. However, it is in line with studies conducted in 
Brazil. This suggests that these results are considered parsimoniously, once the 
environment of application of this concept has not been investigated, for example, it is 
possible that the extension of its application is not understood in its completeness. 
The third hypothesis (H3a and H3b) sought to verify whether the quality of the feedback 
is significantly related to procedural and interactional justice of MCS. The results were 
significant at p < 0.01, i.e. when managers receive high performance feedback MCS tends to 
be considered fair. According to Langevin and Mendoza (2012), an explanation for this is the 
fact that a well elaborated feedback is considered more consistent and precise, which 
complies with the procedural rules of Leventhal et al. (1980). Colquitt and Jackson (2006) 
mention that providing quality feedback encourages communication and leads to 
subordinates’ favorable perception of their superiors. The quality of the feedback may also 
indicate that subordinates are valued and respected as members of the group. 
The fourth hypothesis (H4a and H4b) tested the relationship between the use of multiple 
performance indicators and distributive and procedural justice. The results were significant 
at p < 0.01, which indicates that the use of multiple measures of performance affects the 
distributive and procedural justice. In other words, managers consider that the use of 
multiple indicators increases the likelihood of more accurate assessments of their 
performance, whose argument is in line with Leventhal (1980), Burney et al. (2009) and 
Beuren et al. (2016a, 2016b, 2016c). 
Tables VII and VIII were developed to test the set of hypotheses H5 and H6. Table VII 
presents the results of the indirect effect of the paths. 
In addition to the indirect effect presented, Table VIII shows the results regarding the 
total effect of the paths. 
In relation to the four dimensions of MCS and the budgetary slack (H5a), the results 
indicated that setting objectives, multiple measures of performance and controllability 
principle were not statistically significant. On the other hand, feedback quality was 
significant at p < 0.01, but the coefficient was positive. A negative coefficient was expected 
according to the proposition of the theoretical model, i.e. the quality of the feedback 
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Table VII.  
PLS Results – path 
coefficients – indirect 
effect  
Structural relationship 
Indirect 
effect t-Test Hypothesis p-value  
Distributive justice ! Data manipulation     0.040   0.589 H5b and H6b   0.557 
Procedural justice ! Budgetary slack   0.018   0.260 H5a and H6a   0.795 
Procedural justice ! Data manipulation   0.120   1.588 H5b and H6b   0.113 
Distributive justice ! Budgetary slack   0.138   2.009 H5a and H6a   0.045 
Interactional justice ! Budgetary slack   0.357   3.933 H5a and H6a   0.000 
Interactional justice ! Data manipulation     0.275   2.715 H5b and H6b   0.007 
Setting objectives ! Organizational commitment   0.136   1.927 H5a and H6a   0.055 
Setting objectives ! Trust in the superior   0.019   0.400 H5b and H6b   0.689 
Setting objectives ! Budgetary slack   0.029   0.990 H5a and H6a   0.323 
Setting objectives ! Data Manipulation   0.033   1.193 H5b and H6b   0.234 
M.M. of Performance ! Trust in the superior   0.071   1.400 H5b and H6b   0.162 
M.M. of Performance ! Budgetary slack   0.057   1.648 H5a and H6a   0.100 
M.M. of Performance ! Data manipulation   0.016   0.540 H5b and H6b   0.590 
Controllability principle ! Organizational commitment     0.015   0.260 H5a and H6a   0.795 
Controllability principle ! Trust in the superior     0.030   0.826 H5b and H6b   0.409 
Controllability principle ! Budgetary slack     0.016   0.664 H5a and H6a   0.507 
Controllability principle ! Data manipulation   0.010   0.623 H5b and H6b   0.534 
M.M. of Performance ! Organizational commitment   0.164   2.743 H5a and H6a   0.006 
Quality of feedback ! Organizational commitment   0.247   2.608 H5a and H6a   0.010 
Quality of feedback ! Trust in the superior   0.444   4.960 H5b and H6b   0.000 
Quality of feedback ! Budgetary slack   0.241   3.722 H5a and H6a   0.000 
Quality of feedback ! Data manipulation     0.145   2.190 H5b and H6b   0.029  
Notes: P.S.: *Significance p < 0.05; **significance p < 0.01 
Source: Research data   
Table VIII.  
PLS Results – path 
coefficients – total 
effect  
Structural relationship 
Beta Total 
Effect Total t Test Hypothesis P-value  
Distributive j. ! Commitment   0.231   1.669 H5a and H5b   0.095 
Procedural j. ! Commitment   0.292   2.041 H5a and H5b   0.041* 
Interactional j.! Commitment   0.238   1.652 H5a and H5b   0.099 
Commitment ! Budgetary slack   0.148   1.112 H5a   0.266 
Commitment ! Data manipulation   0.316   2.806 H5b   0.005** 
Distributive j. ! Trust in the superior   0.225   2.055 H6a and H6b   0.040* 
Procedural j. ! Trust in the superior     0.054   0.500 H6a and H6b   0.617 
Interactional j. ! Trust in the superior   0.697   6.104 H6a and H6b   0.000** 
Trust ! Budgetary slack   0.461   3.512 H6a   0.000** 
Trust ! Data manipulation     0.503   4.107 H6b   0.000** 
S. objectives ! Budgetary slack   0.029   0.966 H5a and H6a   0.334 
S. objectives ! Data manipulation   0.033   1.126 H5b and H6b   0.260 
M.M. of performance ! Budgetary slack   0.057   1.621 H5a and H6a   0.105 
M.M. of performance ! Data manipulation   0.016   0.506 H5b and H6b   0.613 
Controllability P. ! Budgetary slack     0.016   0.669 H5a and H6a   0.504 
Controllability P. ! Data manipulation   0.010   0.613 H5b and H6b   0.540 
Q. of Feedback ! Budgetary slack   0.241   3.611 H5a and H6a   0.000** 
Q. of Feedback ! Data manipulation     0.145   2.293 H5b and H6b   0.022*  
Notes: P.S.: *Significance p < 0.05; **significance p < 0.01 
Source: Research data   
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increases the perception of organizational justice, which leads to increase in organizational 
commitment and trust in the superior, reducing the budgetary slack (Langevin and 
Mendoza, 2012). 
For the analysis of the paths, MCS does not reduce the budgetary slack, i.e. hypothesis 
H5a is not confirmed. Regarding the budgetary slack, the analysis of the indirect path of the 
latent variable trust in the superior and budgetary slack present significance, but the 
coefficient proposed by the model is negative. It was hoped that the greater the trust in 
hierarchical superior the lower the propensity to manipulate data would be. The results 
showed that trust is related to data manipulation, but not necessarily to decrease in 
unethical behavior. It is argued that this result may find support in the tolerance to 
ambiguity in relation to the superior, observed in Beuren et al.’s (2016c) study. 
Regarding commitment, statistical significance was not observed, which implies 
rejection of hypothesis H5b. These results indicate that the dimensions of the 
managerial control do not reduce the budgetary slack, i.e. the participation of the 
manager in setting objectives, the use of multiple measures of performance, the control 
of the variables that can influence the performance assessment and the quality of the 
feedback do not diminish the creation of budgetary slack, as proposed by Langevin and 
Mendoza (2012). 
Another surprising result is that the latent variable trust in the superior shows 
significance opposed to what was expected, indicating that the greater the trust of the 
manager in his hierarchical superior, the greater the chances of creating budgetary slack. In 
addition to not conforming to the model proposed by Langevin and Mendoza (2012), this 
result suggests that the excess of proximity between manager and his superior can result in 
unethical behaviors. This result instigates reflections on the theoretical model and more 
empirical research, whether the trust in the superior is an antecedent or a consequent of 
creating organizational slack. 
The sixth hypothesis (H6a and H6b) investigated whether the organizational justice 
perceived in MCS reduces the propensity to create budgetary slack and manipulate data 
with increased trust in the superior and organizational commitment. The results 
indicate that three of the four dimensions of MCS tested did not present statistical 
significance, i.e. setting objectives, controllability principle and multiple measures of 
performance are not related to data manipulation. These results do not corroborate that 
the success of MCS will depend on the organizational commitment, the trust between 
subordinate and superior and the perceived organizational justice in the system 
(Chenhall, 2003). However, the dimension quality of feedback presents statistical 
significance, in addition to signaling through its coefficient that it also reduces the 
manipulation of data, i.e. a quality feedback can help the company fight data 
manipulation. 
Regarding commitment, the results surprisingly indicate that there is a relationship 
between organizational commitment and data manipulation. The coefficient was 
expected to be negative by the model, but it was positive, indicating that commitment 
increases data manipulation, not the opposite as indicated by Langevin and Mendoza 
(2012). It is argued that the investigated companies need to interact in the improvement 
of the organizational commitment related to MCSs, as the theory indicates that the more 
committed with MCSs, the less propensity managers have to manipulate the data. The 
relationship between trust and data manipulation points out that the higher the trust, 
the lower the manager’s propensity to manipulate the data, which is in line with the 
theoretical proposition of Langevin and Mendoza (2012). 
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5. Conclusions 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
The study aimed to validate the theoretical model proposed by Langevin and Mendoza 
(2012), testing the theoretical hypotheses formulated by the authors, which they did not test 
empirically. Descriptive statistics based on the answers to the research instrument, 
composed of 41 assertions to test the theoretical hypotheses of Langevin and Mendoza’s 
(2012) study, show that the 102 respondents presented certain linearity in the levels of 
concordance in relation to the assertives, varying from medium to high. The SEM (PLS-PM) 
technique was used to test the hypotheses. 
In hypothesis H1a it was verified whether the participation in setting objectives is 
significantly related to procedural justice. The results indicated that when managers 
participate in setting objectives, business processes are considered fair. The result is 
consistent with that observed in Langevin and Mendoza (2012). In hypothesis H1b it was 
verified whether the participation in the setting the objectives increases the distributive 
justice perceived in MCS, but the results did not support this statement. 
In the second hypothesis (H2a and H2b), it was investigated whether the application 
of the controllability principle is significantly related to distributive and procedural 
justice. The results were not significant, i.e. when the company applied the 
controllability principle, its managers did not consider the MCS to be fairer. This result 
contradicts the theoretical assumption of Langevin and Mendoza (2012), that when 
managers are assessed only on the basis of what they can control, MCS is perceived as 
fair. 
In the third hypothesis (H3a and H3b) it was analyzed whether the quality of the 
feedback is significantly related to procedural and interactional justice of MCS. The results 
were significant, corroborating with the literature (Leventhal et al., 1980; Colquitt and 
Jackson, 2006; Paiva, 2015). In the fourth hypothesis (H4a and H4b) it was verified whether 
multiple performance indicators are significantly related to distributive and procedural 
justice. The results were significant and converge with the premises of Leventhal (1980) and 
Burney et al. (2009). 
Regarding the hypothesis H5a, the results indicated that setting objectives, multiple 
measures of performance and controllability principle are not statistically significant. The 
quality of the feedback was significant, but with coefficient opposed to what was expected. 
Analyzing the paths, MCS does not reduce budgetary slack, and it is not possible to confirm 
hypothesis H5a. The sixth hypothesis (H6a and H6b) examined whether the organizational 
justice perceived in MCS reduces the propensity to create budgetary slack and manipulate 
the data with increased trust in the superior and organizational commitment. In the test 
results, only the dimension quality of feedback presented statistical significance, besides 
signaling with its coefficient that it reduces data manipulation. 
In summary, the results of the research demonstrate that participation in setting 
objectives increases procedural justice, i.e. the process of participating in setting 
objectives is considered fair, but this is not closely related to the remuneration of 
managers, a fact advocated by literature (H1b). Likewise, disregarding aspects 
uncontrolled by managers in performance assessment does not lead to the perception of 
procedural and distributive justice (H2a and H2b). However, quality of feedback leads 
to the perception that MCS is fair (H3a and H3b), indicating that subordinates feel 
valued and respected as members of the group. Multiple measures of performance 
present similar results, i.e. there is a perception of distributive and procedural justice 
when it is used by the company. 
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5.2 Practical implications 
The research carried out with managers of large Brazilian companies, which investigated 
MCS’s dimensions (participation in the setting objectives, application of the controllability 
principle, use of multiple performance indicators and quality of feedback) increase the 
perception of organizational justice and reduce unhealthy behaviors, has shown that 
the only variable that positively interferes with the reduction of unethical behaviors is the 
quality of feedback. Therefore, from the theoretical framework of Langevin and Mendoza 
(2012), regarding the effects of MCS on unethical behaviors through perceived 
organizational justice, organizational commitment and supervisor trust, only quality of 
feedback interferes in the reduction of the unethical behaviors creation of budgetary slack 
and data manipulation. 
These results differ from those presented by Buzzi et al. (2014), who identified a 
relationship between budgetary slack and budgetary participation. They are in accordance 
with the study by Chong and Strauss (2017), which points to a decrease in the propensity to 
create budgetary slack when the budget is considered participatory and the perception of 
procedural justice is positive. Thus, although the explanation has been partial, with the 
validation of only one of the four elements of the MCS model of Langevin and Mendoza 
(2012), somehow this research can contribute to the warning of Cuguer�o-Escofet and 
Rosanas (2017) about the relevance of understanding the dysfunctional effects of 
measurement and incentives systems. 
5.3 Limitations and/or future research studies 
Participating in setting objectives, using multiple measures of performance and controlling 
factors related to performance evaluation may be linked to greater perception of 
organizational justice. However, other uninvestigated factors may interfere and contribute 
to the reduction of unethical behavior, such as budgetary slack and data manipulation, as 
the only variable that indicated interference in this reduction was quality of feedback. The 
fact that not all hypotheses have been confirmed instigates further research. In this sense, it 
is recommended to replicate the study in other contexts to verify whether the results are 
similar to validate the theoretical model of Langevin and Mendoza (2012) and to look for 
possible ways to overcome those effects considered dysfunctional in organizations. 
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